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Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death
Gary N. Holthus*
F A FATHER AND inS three year-old daughter were walking to church
one bright Sunday morning, and another man wilfully drove
his automobile into them, causing the death of the child, the majority
of American jurisdictions yet would allow merely compensatory dam-
ages under their applicable statutes for wrongful death. But it patently
is unfair to let one who willfully kills another go unpunished. Since
exemplary damages are awarded in other actions at law in order to
punish willful acts, it seems reasonable that exemplary damages should
be allowed in wrongful death actions in an attempt to deter such willful
acts, and in order to do justice in the eyes of the public.
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, smart money
or vindictive damages,' are damages awarded to a plaintiff on a find-
ing of malicious, fraudulent, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct by a
defendant, indifferent to the rights and safety of others. 2 The purpose
of exemplary damages is to protect the public from reckless, willful acts
and to punish the wrongdoer.3
Historically there was a distinction between wrongful death and
survival statutes. The former created a new cause of action in the bene-
ficiaries to compensate them for the loss of the decedent.4 Under the
latter, the decedent's personal representative had the right to carry on
any cause of action the decedent started. 5 In effect, the personal repre-
sentative stepped into the shoes of the decedent.
Today the distinction between wrongful death and survival statutes
still exists in theory. In fact most states have, as a result of "inadequate
drafting on the part of state legislatures," 0 a "hybrid" survival death
statute.7 Although the distinction in modern wrongful death and sur-
* B.S., Kent State University; Second-year student, Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law; Law Clerk for a Cleveland law firm.
1 Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property § 269 (rev. ed. 1961); Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Stevenson, 212 Tenn. 178, 368 S.W. 2d 760 (1963); McCormick, Damages, c. 10
(1935).
2 Mode v. Barnett, 235 Ark. 675, 361 S.W. 2d 525 (1962).
3 Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua, 416 S.W. 2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Templeton
Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 334, 446 P. 2d 152 (1968).
4 Fornaro v. Jill Bros. Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 1031, 249 N.Y.S. 2d 833 (1964).
5 Bell v. Cincinnati Transit Co., 108 Ohio App. 229, 155 N.E. 2d 698 (1958), Vassallo
v. Nederl-Americk Stoomv Matts Holland, 337 S.W. 2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
6 Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 14:1 (Lawyers Co-op, Rochester, N.Y.
1966).
7 The survival-death statutes vary widely from the true survival statute and for that
matter from one another. For example the statutes in Connecticut, Iowa, New Hamp-
shire and Tennessee provide for recovery for wrongful death but the action must be
brought under their enlarged survival-death statute often referred to as "death acts."
Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. v. Shewalther, 128 Tenn. 363, 161 S.W. 1136 (1913).
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vival statutes seemingly has been obliterated, some states hold to the
traditional distinction between them.s
Punitive damages under a wrongful death or survival statute are
not a matter of right but are given only where there is statutory law
that permits them." When punitive damages are sought in a wrong-
ful death action, the decedent's beneficiaries or personal representative
must prove that the defendant was acting wilfully or wantonly when
he inflicted the fatal blow.
Most states require that the plaintiff be entitled to actual damages
before he has the right to exemplary damages. 10 However, the District
of Columbia 1 and New York 12 have allowed punitive damages where
the jury found no actual damages. It is the rule in some states that when
the death of the wrongdoer is instantaneous the decedent's beneficiaries
have no right to recover exemplary damages. The rationale is that the
decedent did not live long enough to acquire any cause of action that
could survive to his personal representative. 13
The rule in those relatively few states that allow exemplary dam-
ages under their wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute is to
punish the wrongdoer's willful act, thereby making an example of
him.14 Alabama goes so far as to base the awarding of exemplary dam-
ages on the degree of the wrongdoer's culpability. 15 In carrying this
doctrine to its logical end, a defendant of slight culpability causing the
decedent's beneficiaries a tremendous loss would face less liability than
a highly culpable defendant doing only slight pecuniary harm.16
Ohio also requires that willful or wanton acts be done by the wrong-
doer 17 before it will award to the decedent's beneficiaries exemplary
damages to punish the culprit.1 s However, Ohio 19 as well as thirty-
three other states, generally has not allowed exemplary damages in a
8 Frankel v. Burke's Excavating Inc., 223 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
9 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. Ann. Art. 4673 (1952).
10 Stephenson v. Collins, 210 S. 2d 733 (Fla. 1968); Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp.
437 (D.C. Pa. 1965).
11 First Nat'l Realty Co. v. Weathers, 154 A. 2d 548 (Mun. Ct. of App. D.C. 1959).
12 Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 114 (1967).
13 Turcol v. Junkins, 49 Del. 596, 122 A. 2d 224 (1956).
14 Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W. 2d 1 (1964).
15 Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. Rose, 274 Ala. 429, 149 S. 2d 821 (1962).
16 Speiser, supra n. 6 at § 3:3.
17 Levin v. Elyria Sign Co., 1 Ohio App. 2d 542, 206 N.E. 2d 38 (1965).
18 Curry v. Big Bears Store Co., 75 Ohio L. Abs. 148, 142 N.E. 2d 684 (1956).
19 Ollier v. Lake Cent. Airlines, Inc., 423 F. 2d 554 (6th Cir. 1970).
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR DEATH
wrongful death action. 20 Likewise, several federal statutes do not al-
low punitive damages for a decedent's wrongful death. 21
In effect, what these state and federal statutes are saying is that
when a person is wrongfully killed, his appointed representatives' or
beneficiaries' right, as well as the public's right, to punish the culprit
terminates. It is true that any right in a wrongful death action is statu-
tory, the right not having been originally recognized at common law.
22
Notwithstanding the view that most jurisdictions refrain from al-
lowing punitive damages where the decedent is wrongfully killed by
another, sixteen states hold to the contrary.23 There is much diversity
amongst these states as to the statutory provisions allowing punitive
damages under the applicable wrongful death, survival or "hybrid"
statute, but at least the interested parties' right as well as the public's
right to punish the culprit is preserved.
24
Development of Statutory Rights in Wrongful Death
The first reported case denying any recovery for the wrongful death
of another was the case of Baker v. Bolton,25 wherein Lord Ellen-
borough denied the plaintiff's action for recovery of damages for his
wife's wrongful death. With some reluctance, the American courts fol-
lowed the rule of Baker v. Bolton.26 In 1846 Lord Campbell's Act, en-
titled "An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Ac-
cidents," was passed.2 7 It was the first legislation that allowed damages
for the life of a decedent who was wrongfully killed, and the fore-
runner of today's statutory law on wrongful death.
In addition to the courts reasoning through the injustice worked by
the rule in Baker's case,28 Lord Campbell's Act gave the American
courts a more reasonable law to deal with the interested parties' loss of
20 States not allowing exemplary damages: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands,
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
21 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1969). See also, Platis v. United
States, 288 F. Supp. 254 (Utah, 1968).
22 Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W. 2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
23 Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas and West Virginia allow punitive damages for wrongful death.
21 Supra n. 18.
25 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Reprint 1033 (1808) as cited by Speiser,
supra n. 6 at 2.
26 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Chamber, 73 Ohio St. 16, 76 N.E. 91 (1905); Carey v. Berk-
shire R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1848).
27 Lord Campbell's Act, 9&10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846) as cited by Speiser, supra n. 6 at
§ 1:7.
28 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Chamber, supra n. 26.
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loved ones by the wrongful act of another. After New York passed the
first wrongful death statute in 1847, the majority of the other states
passed similar legislation affording rights for the wrongful death of a
person.
Since the action for wrongful death was not allowed at common
law, it was purely a creature of statute29 and must be strictly con-
strued.30 Many of the states not allowing exemplary damages for a
wrongful death base their reasoning on this strict rule of interpreting
their applicable statute.3 1 However, it is highly questionable how long
public policy will allow defendants who caused the willful, malicious
death of another to be released by strict interpretation. The public
wants to see a willful wrongdoer punished. 32 It will not approve the
courts' refusal to view these statutes as remedial when, in fact, some
courts are taking the more liberal view to meet the demands of justice.33
Most States Do Not Allow Punitive Damages in Wrongful
Death Actions
"It is the general rule in this country that punitive or punitive dam-
ages for death are not recoverable under statutes modeled after Lord
Campbell's Act, or under any form of statute which does not expressly
or by clear implication confer a right to such damages." 34 The rationale
for the majority of those states not allowing punitive damages under a
wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute may be summarized as
follows: (1) Many of those states not allowing exemplary damages
under their applicable legislation do not do so because the right to re-
cover damages for a wrongful death did not exist at common law and
is purely a creature of statute35 and must be strictly construed. 36
Therefore, where the right to exemplary damages is not expressly set
forth, no right is construed to exist; (2) Some states interpret their
statutory provisions on wrongful death as creating a new cause of ac-
tion in the beneficiaries. Thus, any personal right of action the de-
cedent would have experienced had he lived terminated with his
death 37; (3) A portion of the states feels that the purpose of their wrong-
ful death, survival or "hybrid" statute is not to punish the wrong-
29 Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 NJ. 194, 254 A. 2d 202 (1962).
30 Limbaugh v. Woodall, 121 Ga. App. 638, 175 S.E. 2d 135 (1970).
31 Frazier v. Oil Chem. Co., 407 Pa. 78, 179 A. 2d 202 (1962).
32 Supra n. 18.
33 Hunter v. Dampsk A/S Flint, 279 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
34 Meehan v. Cent. R.R. of New Jersey, 181 F. Supp. 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); See
also 94 A.L.R. 384, 386 (1935).
35 Supra n. 29.
36 Estrow v. Wilson, 30 App. Div. 2d 646, 291 N.Y.S. 2d 46 (1968).
37 Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.E. 2d 124 (1967).
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doer.38 The awarding of punitive damages is contrary to the judicial
theory of these states; (4) Other states not ordinarily allowing ex-
emplary damages for wrongful death construe their statutes remedially 39
when justice or public policy requires the wrongdoer to be punished
or where a special statutory provision provides for exemplary dam-
ages.40
It appears from the cases and statutory law of several jurisdictions
that they have beaten an old horse into the ground in that the old maxim
of statutory construction has been followed blindly! 41 The common law
is the foundation of our Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, and
traditionally when statutory laws were enacted, they were looked upon
with suspicion by the courts which were reluctant to go beyond their
explicit language.42 The body of statutory law today is so vast that the
prior justification for strict construction seems unreasonable if it does
not produce a just result.
The present trend of the courts is to harmonize all justified rights
under the common law with laws that are in derogation of it. 4 3 Further-
more, it is the duty of the court to construe the law not only as black
and white, but also with an interpretation that interweaves new statu-
tory law with our inherited body of common law principles.44
Certainly the legislative intent is of uppermost concern to the court
in construing a wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute. In Breckon
v. Franklin45 the court stated, "the legislative intent has been desig-
nated the vital part, heart, soul and essence of the law," but it is unrea-
sonable to think that the legislature's intent was to allow a malicious,
willful, wanton act to go unpunished.
Virginia takes a unique stand to buttress their tendency to deny
exemplary damages in a wrongful death action. Their position asserts
that since a wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action in
the beneficiaries it would be unjust to give the beneficiaries the de-
38 Dahl v. N. Am. Creameries Inc., 61 N.W. 2d 916 (Sup. Ct. of N. Dak., 1953).
39 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:31-1 (1952); Turon v. J. & L. Constr. Co., 8 N.J. 543, 86 A. 2d
192 (1952).
40 Archer v. Bowling, 166 Ky. 139, 179 S.W. 15 (1915).
41 The following are not in accord with allowing exemplary damages in wrongful
death in that they follow the strict construction doctrine: Engle v. Finch, 37 Ga. App.
452, 140 S.E. 632 (1927); Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 89 N.E. 2d (1949); De Moss v.
Walker, 242 Ia. 911, 48 N.W. 2d 811 (1951); Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.
2d 611 (1965); Estrow v. Wilson, 30 App. Div. 2d 646, 291 N.Y.S. 2d (1968); Greene
v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E. 2d 521 (1968); Mathies v. Kittrell, 350 P. 2d 951 (Sup.
Ct. of Okla., 1960); Holmes v. Oregon & California Ry. Co., 5 F. 523 (D.C. Ore. 1881);
Platis v. United States, 409 F. 2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1969); Wyoming: Bostwick article,
2 Land & Water L. Rev. 405 (1967).
42 Plunkett, A Concise History of the Common Law 327 (5th ed. 1956).
43 People v. One 1962 Chevrolet Bel Air, 56 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1967).
44 Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
45 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W. 836 (1970).
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cedent's personal cause of action. The rationale is based on the fact
that the decedent's personal cause of action existed and expired before
the beneficiaries had a right of action.46 Therefore, the heirs are entitled
merely to compensatory damages regardless of how willful or wanton
the culprit's acts were.
Alaska,47 Kansas, 4s and South Dakota 49 do not allow exemplary
damages in a wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute in that "they
could not agree that the theory of the law was to punish .... ," 50
However, the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled in 1913 that a plaintiff,
who had brought a private action for malicious prosecution, was entitled
to punitive damages.51 In 1969, the same theory was expounded in an
assault and battery case.52 Notwithstanding the fact that neither of
these cases were brought under a wrongful death, survival or "hybrid"
statute, these decisions seem to indicate the court's consent to award
exemplary damages where a gross wrong has been done. Why then
does not the willful, wanton killing of another merit exemplary dam-
ages?
Although several of the states advocate refraining from reading a
right into their statutes where one is not explicitly stated,5 3 others will
construe the statute remedially where a gross injustice would be worked
if punitive damages were denied. 54 Many of the jurisdictions not allow-
ing exemplary damages set a maximum amount for compensatory dam-
ages.5 5 Others leave the question of damages up to the jury to de-
termine what is a fair and just amount. The terms "fair" and "just" in
the Wyoming statute, 50 as in others,5 7 suggest that fair play along
with justice existed in the minds of the legislature when drafting the
said law. The mere plea for damages to punish a willful and wanton
act of a wrongdoer, who refused to play by the rules of society, does
not seem to contradict that intention.
46 Supra n. 37.
47 Linge's Adm'r v. Alaska Treadwell Co., 3 Alaska 9 (1906).
48 Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 71 Kan. 524, 81 P. 205 (1905).
49 Supra n. 38.
50 Supra n. 48; at 529.
51 Stalker v. Drake, 91 Kan. 142, 136 P. 912 (1913).
52 Rooks v. Brunch, 202 Kan. 441, 449 P. 2d 580 (1969).
53 Supra n. 41.
54 Iowa, Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); New Jersey, Kern
v. Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 186, 226 A. 2d 186 (1967).
55 Some of the states and their limits are as follows: Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, § 2
(Smith-Hurd 1959) limited to $30,000.00; Kan. St. Ann. § 60-1903 (1964) limited to
$35,000.00 and costs; Minn. St. Ann. § 573.02 (1947) limited to $35,000.00; N.H. Rev.
St. Ann. § 556.13 (1955) limited to $20,000.00 if no dependents and $60,000.00 if de-
pendents; Code of Va. § 8-636 (1957) limited to $50,000.00.
56 Wyo. St. Ann. § 1-1066 (1959).
57 Ark. St. Ann. § 27-909 (1962); N.C. Gen. St. § 28-174 (1966).
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The Ohio Position
Ohio strictly construes its wrongful death5s and survival statutes.5 9
Since neither the wrongful death nor the survival statutes explicitly
award exemplary damages, the courts simply have refused to entertain
any plea for them. The traditional position of Ohio in regard to wrong-
ful death is set forth in Klebolte v. Buffon, 0 where Justice Newman ex-
pounded: "If it had been intended that the injured party should have
the right to recover exemplary or punitive damages, or any damages
other than actual damages, the Legislature would have made such a
provision." Yet, in 1971 Ohio applied its "unlimited damages for death"
measure in a wrongful death action involving Ohio parties, even though
the action arose from an accident in Illinois, which limits death dam-
ages.oa
If the jury finds that there is a right to damages under the wrong-
ful death statute, two distinct actions are maintainable: (1) One is for
the next of kin, (2) the other for the benefit of the estate.6 1 The dam-
ages allowed under the wrongful death statute are merely compensa-
tory; 62 they do not even allow a father to recover for his son's funeral
expenses.63 If it is any consolation, the amount of pecuniary damages
is not limited by the Ohio Constitution.
64
Ohio's survival statute allows the decedent's personal representa-
tive to bring an action for mesne profits, deceit, fraud, and injuries
to persons or property for the benefit of the decedent's estate.65 The
courts have not allowed punitive damages to the decedent's personal
representative under this survival statute.6 6 In addition to the previous
distinctions made between wrongful death and survival statutes, a re-
cent Ohio case6 7 deals with a rather interesting distinction in that if a
claim is brought under the wrongful death statute and there are no
real parties (next of kin), then the action must die. Under the survival
statute, the benefit is for the estate and only a personal representative
may sue. Therefore, the representative can proceed with the survival
action regardless of whether or not any of the real parties are still avail-
able. Notwithstanding the rights available to the heirs, the estate, and
58 Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2125.01 et. seq. (Page's 1968).
59 Id., § 2305.21 (Page's 1954).
60 89 Ohio St. 61, 66, 105 N.E. 192, 193 (1913).
60a Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193 (1971).
61 Moss v. Hirzel Canning Co., 100 Ohio App. 509, 137 N.E. 2d 440 (1955).
62 Ohio Rev. Code, supra n. 58.
63 Caswell v. Harry Miller Excavating Co., 20 Ohio Misc. 46, 246 N.E. 2d 921 (1969).
64 Ohio Const., Art. I, § 19a.
65 Ohio Rev. Code, supra n. 59.
66 Supra n. 19.
67 Fisher v. Butler, 11 Ohio Misc. 116, 224 N.E. 2d 923 (1966).
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the personal representative under the present wrongful death and sur-
vival statute, the courts of Ohio have not extended these rights to in-
clude exemplary damages in a wrongful death action.
Present Trend
The present trend of some states is to allow punitive damages in a
wrongful death action where the decedent met his death as the result
of the willful, wanton act of another. Among those states are: Ala-
bama, s Arizona, 9 Delaware,7 Florida,7 Kentucky,7 2 Massachusetts,7 3
Mississippi,74 Missouri,7 Montana, 76 Nevada,7 7 New Mexico,78 Pennsyl-
vania,7 9 South Carolina, 0 Tennessee,"' Texas,82 and West Virginia.8 3
The rationale of these states allowing punitive damages in a wrong-
ful death action can be classified as follows: (1) The purpose of the
applicable wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute is to punish
the wrongdoer8 4 ; (2) To deter individuals from committing willful,
malicious acts that result in great bodily harm and death to others be-
cause the public has a right to be protected from such outrageous con-
ducts5 ; (3) To construe the state's wrongful death, survival or "hy-
brid" statute remedially and interpret the legislative intent to be to allow
exemplary damages.8 , More specifically:
Alabama: This state takes a unique position and treats its wrong-
ful death statutes7 as punitive in nature rather than compensatory. The
recovery by the decedent's executors or personal representative is
68 Lankford v. Mong, 283 Ala. 24, 214 S. 2d 301 (1968).
69 Bois v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P. 2d 917 (1965).
70 Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A. 2d 760 (Del. 1965).
71 Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 S. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969).
72 Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 411.150 (1970); supra n. 40.
73 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (1955); Bannon v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1050
(D.R.I. 1968).
74 Miss. Code Ann. § 1454 (1957); Bush v. Watkins, 224 Miss. 238, 80 S. 2d 19 (1955).
75 Mo. Ann. St. § 537.080 (1953); May v. Bradford, 369 S.W. 2d 225 (Supt. Ct. of Mo.
1963).
76 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 93-2810 (1964); Gagnier v. Curran Constr. Co., 151 Mont.
468, 443 P. 2d 894 (1968).
77 Nev. Rev. St. § 41.080 et seq. (1967).
78 N.M. St. Ann. § 22-20-3 (1953); Baca v. Baca, 472 P. 2d 997 (N.M. 1970).
79 Hennigan v. Atl. Ref. Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
80 Dawson v. S. Carolina Power Co., 220 S.C. 26, 66 S.E. 2d 322 (1951).
81 Supra n. 14.
82 FWA Drilling Co. Inc. v. Lambert, 418 S.W. 2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
83 Turner v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 40 W. Va. 675, 22 S.E. 83 (1895).
84 Braun v. Moreno, 11 Ariz. App. 509, 466 P. 2d 60 (1970).
85 Mo. Ann. St., supra n. 75.
86 Supra n. 69.
87 7 Ala. Code § 123 (1960).
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based on the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer's act.8 The wrong-
ful death statute creates a new cause of action in the decedent's heirs
as long as the action is brought within two years from the time of the de-
cedent's death. Alabama's survival statute 9 allows a personal repre-
sentative to bring the decedent's personal cause of action in an attempt
to punish the wrongdoer and protect the public from willful, wanton
acts.
Arizona: In Boles v. Coles, the Supreme Court of Arizona set
forth its position on exemplary damages in wrongful death actions:
The general rule is that the allowance of exemplary or punitive
damages is based on aggravated, wanton, reckless or intentional
wrongdoing. We hold that the use of the words "aggravated cir-
cumstances" as applied to the wrongful death act is a clear impli-
cation of legislative intent to allow punitive damages in wrongful
death actions.90
Delaware: The position of this jurisdiction is to punish the wrong-
doer for malicious acts. The right to punish the culprit may be sought
and had only under the state's survival statute. 91 No action for ex-
emplary damages is allowed under the wrongful death statute since
the statute brings forth a new cause of action in the heirs, who have
no right to start an action that existed prior to their right of action.
Florida: In this jurisdiction both wrongful death and survival
statutes are on the books. There is no right to exemplary damages under
the wrongful death statute, but there is a right to punish the culprit
under the survival statute.9 2 The legislative intent is to allow exemplary
damages, as demonstrated in a recent state Supreme Court decision in
which the father of a young child who drowned because of the defend-
ant's willful misconduct was awarded $35,000.00 as punitive dam-
ages.9 3
Kentucky: Section 411.150(4) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
Annotated94 is titled "Action by widow or child of person killed with
deadly weapon," and allows recovery of exemplary damages.
Massachusetts: The law here holds that the right to death damages
may be punitive, in order to deter willful acts that harm others.95 The
case of Bannon v. United States,96 not only sets forth one solution to
the problem that a court faces when the wrongful act occurs in one
88 Supra n. 15.
89 Ala. Code, supra n. 87; at § 150.
90 Supra n. 69 at 921.
91 10 Del. Code Ann. § 3701 et seq. (1953); See also supra n. 70.
92 Fowlkes v. Sinnamon, 97 S. 2d 626 (Fla. 1957).
93 Supra n. 71.
94 Ky. Rev. St. Ann., supra n. 72.
95 Mass. Ann. laws, supra n. 73.
96 Bannon v. U.S., supra n. 73.
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state and the death in another (may apply lex loci delicti)9 7, but also
firmly establishes the personal representative's right to exemplary dam-
ages.
Mississippi: Section 1453 of the Mississippi Code Annotated pro-
vides to any interested party the right to "recover such damages as
the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the
damages of every kind to the decedent ... ." 98 In Young v. Columbus
& G. Ry. Co., which aided in securing the right to exemplary damages
for a wrongful death in Mississippi, the court left the amount of punitive
damages up to the jury, even though actual damages were not proven.99
Missouri: Section 537.080 et seq. of the Annotated Laws of Mis-
souri'0 0 allow punitive damages not only where the acts of the wrong-
doer were willful and wanton but also where the facts indicate an "ag-
gravating circumstance" created by the defLendant. 1° 1
Montana: Section 17-208 of Montana's Code allows awarding of
punitive damages in a wrongful death action as long as the breach
of duty or obligation does not arise in contract.10 2 When a culprit in
effect manifests gross contempt for rights of others, punitive damages
will be awarded.'0 3
97 The lex loci delicti is a long settled law, that wrongful death actions, being un-
known to the common law, derive from statutes only and that the statute which gov-
erns such an action is that of the place of the wrong. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 172 N.E. 2d 526 (1969); Griffin v. Planters Chem. Corp., 302 F.
Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1969). Speaking in terms of a hypothetical fact situation, if X
State had a wrongful death statute with a $15,000.00 limitation and State Y a limit
of $50,000.00, it is obvious that the decedent's administrator would seek to have the
laws of State Y govern his wrongful death action. Under the lex loci delicti the ad-
ministrator would fail if the act happened in State X. Is the mere fact that one was
injured in a State other than where he dies a just rationale for denying his estate
the higher amount? However, today the courts have become cognizant of the injus-
tice and hardship that this rule of law often created. Recent cases have moved away
from strictly applying the lex loci delicti theory, in that "our fast changing and mov-
ing era with its attendant new social and economic problems, requires a re-evalua-
tion of the choice of law rule .... The nice tidy provision of uniformity and sim-
plicity should not prevail over elementary choice influencing considerations, public
policy, decency and justice." Williams v. Texas Kenworth Co., 307 F. Supp. 748, 752
(W.D. Okla. 1969).
In some cases the "center of gravity" rule is a more reasonable solution to use
in determining the law to apply. The "center of gravity" is determined by the place
where the most significant part of the relationship between the parties occurred.
Mitchell v. Craft, 211 S. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968). This theory ("C.O.G.") creates another
tool for the practitioner in that if the State allowing the more money or exemplary
damages is the place where the act occurred, then he can argue lex loci delicti and,
if not, one can argue the substantive relation theory, i.e., "Center of Gravity" and
see, Fox case, supra, n. 60a.
98 Miss. Code Ann., § 1453 (1957).
99 165 Miss. 287, 147 S. 342 (1933).
100 Mo. Ann. St. § 537.080 et seq. (1953).
101 Mo. Ann. St., supra n. 75.
102 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 17-208 (1967). In any action for breach of an obligation
not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud
or malice, actual or presumed, the jury in addition to the actual damages, may give
damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.
103 Gagnier v. Curran, supra n. 76.
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Nevada: Allows punitive damages in a wrongful death action. The
legislature went to the trouble to explicitly spell out this right:
The court or jury in every such action may give such damages,
pecuniary and exemplary, as it shall deem fair and just. Every
person entitled to such action, and every person for whose benefit
such action is brought, may prove his respective damages, and the
court or jury may award such person that amount of damages to
which it considers such person entitled .... 104
New Mexico: Under section 22-20-3 of New Mexico Statutes An-
notated 10 5 ". . . the jury in every such action (wrongful death) may
give such damages, compensatory and exemplary as they shall deem
fair and just. . . ." The purpose is to make reckless, willful acts costly
for the wrongdoer. 10 6
Pennsylvania: The decedent's personal representative, who claims
punitive damages, may have the right to them under this state's sur-
vival statute. 10 7 The courts in this jurisdiction take the position that,
even though the right to exemplary damages is not explicitly set forth
in the survival statute, the right does exist. The rationale is that since
punitive damages are recognized in appropriate other cases, reprehen-
sible conduct that results in the death of another is an appropriate case
for exemplary damages, saying:
Within the survival act no mention is made of damages per se. We
see no reason to read into the act a limitation on the nature or
amount of recovery. Certainly the legislature was aware that the
courts of Pennsylvania recognize punitive damages in an ap-
propriate case, when they passed the act.108
As in several of the other jurisdictions allowing punitive damages,
Pennsylvania declares a purpose to punish outrageous conduct'0 9 and
to discourage wrongdoers.
South Carolina: The right to punitive damages in death actions
exists in South Carolina,110 and is provided within the statute:
In every such action the jury may give such damages, including
exemplary damages when such wrongful act, neglect or default
was the result of recklessness, wilfulness or malice, as they may
104 Nev. Rev. St., supra n. 77 at § 41.100.
105 N.M. St. Ann., supra n. 78.
106 Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 467 P. 2d 14 (1970).
107 The Pennsylvania statute does not explicitly provide for exemplary damages in
wrongful death actions; "All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except
actions for slander or libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defend-
ant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants." 20 Pa. St. Ann.,
§ 320.601 (1950).
108 Supra n. 79 at 683.
109 Id., citing Restatement of Torts, § 908, comment a (1939).
110 Supra n. 80; Wherein the jury awarded $10,000.00 exemplary damages to dece-
dent's administrator when defendant drove a passenger bus at high speeds without
any horn, brakes and with utter disregard for life.
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think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the
parties respectively for whom and whose benefit such action shall
be brought .. 111
Tennessee: Allows punitive damages in wrongful death actions
when the claimant alleges and proves the defendant's willful, wanton
conduct.
Exemplary damages will be allowed where willful misconduct or
entire want of care, which would raise the presumption of a con-
conscious indifference to consequences. In such cases the interest
of society and other aggrieved individuals are blended and such
damages are allowed as punishment for such conduct and as an
example or warning to the one so guilty, and others, in order to
deter them from committing like offenses in the future.112
Texas: Provides the right to punitive damages in a wrongful death
action by statute, by case law, and by a constitutional provision. The
statutory section applies:
When the death is caused by the willful act or omission, or gross
negligence of the defendant, exemplary as well as actual damages
may be recovered. 113
Texas is in accord with those states that award punitive damages
in wrongful death actions more for the purpose of punishing the wrong-
doer than to benefit the estate." 4 The right of the plaintiff to punitive
damages is also provided in the Texas constitution:
Every person, corporation, or company, that may commit a homi-
cide, through willful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be re-
sponsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow,
heirs of his or her body. .... 115
West Virginia: This jurisdiction is one of the pioneers in the area
of awarding punitive damages in a wrongful death action." 6 This state
allows punitive damages where the act of the wrongdoer was willful
and wanton.
The Federal laws also show a trend towards allowing punitive
damages in a wrongful death action. Although no federal statute deal-
ing with wrongful death explicitly allows exemplary damages,117 there
is federal legislation that recognizes the aggrieved parties' right to such
I"I S.C. Code Ann. § 10-1954 (1962).
112 Supra n. 14 at 4.
113 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. Ann., supra n. 9.
114 Supra n. 82.
115 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. Ann., supra n. 9; See, Art. 16 § 26 (1955).
116 Supra n. 83.
117 Fed. Tort Claims Act, supra n. 21; "The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable
for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages. . ..
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damages. 1 18 The case of Braizer v. Cherry,119 involving an action by the
decedent's representatives against two Georgia police officers who killed
the decedent and allegedly violated his civil rights under the Federal
Civil Rights Act, held that "Congress adopted as federal law the cur-
rent effective state law on the general right of survival." 120
In the woeds of Justice Cardozo:
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms
of the law. . . It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging
process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very
evils to be remedied. There are times when uncertain words are
to be wrought into consistency and unity with a legislative policy
which is itself a source of law, a new generative impulse trans-
mitted to the legal system.121
Refusal to award exemplary damages patently encourages gross
negligence. It still "pays," in some states, to kill a victim rather than
injure him, if a dead man's heirs have no right to punitive damages,
while if the victim pulls through he may sue for exemplary damages. 12 2
Original statutory laws on wrongful death never allowed exemplary
damages, and the rule of strict construction prevented the courts from
reading the right to punitive damages into their statutes. 123 Today,
logic and public policy indicate a need for a more liberal interpretation
of the applicable wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute in that
today's enormous body of statutory law makes nonsense of the theory
behind the strict construction doctrine.124 The logic behind the majority
view of wrongful death, 125 survival or "hybrid" statute has reduced
itself to absurdity. An example of the injustice that can result from
a wrongful death, survival or "hybrid" statute that does not allow puni-
tive damages is the recent Ohio Common Pleas Court decision of
Ranells v. City of Cleveland.126
In the Ranells case the decedents, who were husband and wife, died
from inhaling a lethal amount of chlorine gas that had escaped from a
water filtration plant maintained by the City. It was alleged and proven
118 Fed. Civ. Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 1988 (1970); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.
2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 299, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
119 293 F. 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961).
120 Id., at 405.
121 Van Beeck v. Sabine, 57 S. Ct. 452, 300 U.S. 342, 350 (1937).
122 "The public policy underlying exemplary damages is to punish the wrongdoer.
Logic dictates that if a wrongdoer may be punished if his victim lives, then surely
he should not escape retribution if his wrongful act causes a death." Leahy v. Mor-
gan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425 (D.C.N.D. Iowa 1967).
123 Supra n. 29, 30.
124 Supra n. 43, 44.
125 Supra n. 58.
126 (No. 874668-Decided October 23, 1970), Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County, Cleveland, Ohio (Appeal No. 30780).
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by the plaintiff's counsel that the City had knowledge of the repairs
necessary and that the dangers were grossly neglected by the City.
It was further shown by the plaintiff's counsel that the decedents suf-
fered for a period of time after being affected by the chlorine gas. The
fact that the decedents had suffered before expiring resulted in a
$1,359,032.50 verdict for the plaintiff, $750,000.00 of which was awarded
as punitive damages. If the decedents had not suffered before expiring,
then the award of exemplary damages would have totaled zero dol-
lars. It is simply unreasonable that the mere fact that one lives for a
moment before his death will afford the right to punish the wrongdoer
via punitive damages, while one who dies instantaneously loses this right.
Conclusion
Punitive damages presently are not allowed in the majority of juris-
dictions in the United States. However, the laws should fit the needs
of society.127 The present trend in many states is to allow punitive dam-
ages in a wrongful death action, in order to punish the wrongdoer and in
order to do justice. It is to be hoped, as Shakespeare said, that "the law
hath not been dead, though it hath slept." 128
127 Note, Measure of Damages for the Wrongful Death of the Head of the Family in
Iowa, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 494 (1954).
128 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure (Act 2, Scene 2).
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